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Abstract
This paper presents a general equilibrium model that is consistent with recent empirical
evidence showing that the U.S. price level and ination are much more responsive to aggre-
gate technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks. The model of this paper builds on
recent work by Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009), who show that models of endogenous
attention allocation deliver prices to be more responsive to more volatile shocks as, every-
thing else being equal, rms pay relatively more attention to more volatile shocks. In fact,
according to the U.S. data, aggregate technology shocks are more volatile than monetary
policy shocks inducing in this paper, rms to pay more attention to the former than to
the latter. However, most important, this work adds to the literature by showing that the
ability of the model of this paper to account for observed price dynamics crucially depends
on monetary policy. In particular, this paper shows how interest rate feedback rules af-
fect the incentives faced by rms in allocating attention. A policy rate responding more
actively to expected ination and output uctuations induces rms to pay relatively more
attention to more volatile shocks. This new mechanism of transmission of monetary policy
helps rationalizing the observed behavior of prices in response to technology and monetary
policy shocks, and implies novel predictions about the impact of changes in Taylor rules
coe¢ cients on economic uctuations.
*Email: luigi.paciello@eief.it. A previous draft of this paper was circulating under the
title: "The Response of Prices to Aggregate Technology and Monetary Policy Shocks under
Rational Inattention". I am grateful to Pierpaolo Benigno, Martin Eichenbaum, Christian
Hellwig, Giorgio Primiceri and Mirko Wiederholt for suggestions and comments.
1 Introduction
Recent empirical work on nominal price adjustment has shown that the U.S. aggregate
price level and ination are much more responsive to aggregate technology shocks,
such as innovation in total factor productivity, than to monetary policy shocks, such as
unexpected innovations in the Federal Funds rate.1 Standard models of sticky prices
have a hard time explaining the di¤erent behavior of the price level and ination
in response to these two aggregate shocks.2 Indeed, one of the central issues in
modern macroeconomics is understanding how rms set their prices in response to
di¤erent aggregate shocks. This is an important task for monetary policy analysis and
implementation. Understanding the transmission of technology and monetary policy
shocks is particularly relevant as these shocks account together for a large fraction of
business cycle uctuations.3
I present a model that is consistent with the empirical evidence that prices re-
spond much more quickly to aggregate technology shocks than to monetary policy
shocks. I show that this response pattern arises naturally in a framework based on
imperfect information with an endogenous choice of information structure similar to
Sims [24]. In this model, rms will optimally choose to allocate more attention to
those particular shocks that, in expectations, most reduce prots when prices are not
adjusted properly. The more attention rms pay to a type of shock, the faster they
respond to it.
This is a result that has been emphasized in the seminal paper by Mackowiak and
Wiederholt [18], where these authors have shown that rms pay more attention to
sector specic shocks than to aggregate nominal shocks roughly because the former
are much more volatile than the latter. So, at rst sight, this result would directly
translate to a framework with aggregate technology and monetary policy shocks:
1See Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde [2] and Paciello [21]. Figure 1 at the end of the
paper plots ination and price level responses estimated by Paciello [21].
2See Dupor, Han and Tsai [10].
3See, for intance, Smets and Wouters (2007).
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since in the U.S. aggregate technology shocks are more volatile than monetary policy
shocks, everything else being equal, rms allocate more attention to the former than
to latter, inducing faster price responses to technology shocks.4
However, most important, I show that this not the whole story. In a standard
general equilibrium model, for given shock volatilities, there are two important chan-
nels that may amplify or reduce di¤erences in attention allocation across di¤erent
types of shocks. These channels relate to monetary policy and real rigidities. Both
channels inuence the attention allocation decision by changing the incentives faced
by rms in allocating attention. In particular, the monetary policy channel has not
been studied in the literature.
I show that, when monetary policy follows a simple interest rate feedback rule,
such as a Taylor rule, a policy responding more to expected ination and output
uctuations increases complementarity in attention allocation. This higher comple-
mentarity induce rms to pay more attention to the same variables that other rms
pay more attention to, amplifying the di¤erence in price responsiveness to technology
and monetary policy shocks. Under the benchmark calibration of the model, mone-
tary policy activism substantially contributes to magnifying the impact of di¤erent
shock volatilities onto attention allocation decision. This amplication helps to ra-
tionalize the observed di¤erence in price responsiveness to technology and monetary
policy shocks.
Moreover, these results unveil a novel mechanism of transmission of monetary
policy to the economy: monetary policy a¤ects price responsiveness through its feed-
back on the attention allocation decision. This mechanism introduces an asymmetry
in the way changes in coe¢ cients of the Taylor rule inuence price responsiveness
to di¤erent shocks. When, for instance, coe¢ cients on expected ination and out-
put uctuations increase, the new equilibrium is characterized by a larger fraction of
4Figure 2 at the end of the paper plots the growth rate in total factor productivity and the change
in the FedFunds rate from 1960 to 2007. Other authors have estimated the volatility of technology
and monetary policy shocks within DSGE models. See, for instance, Smets and Wouters [25].
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attention paid to the most volatile shocks, and a smaller fraction paid to the least
volatile ones. As a consequence the change in policy, everything else being equal, this
channel of transmission causes price variability to reduce relatively less conditional
on the most volatile shocks, and more conditional on the least volatile ones.
In addition, this paper adds to the literature by deriving a closed form solution
to the static linear-quadratic version of the general equilibrium model. This solu-
tion yields valuable economic insights on the feedback from the di¤erent structural
parameters of the model to the attention allocation decision, and allows to fully cap-
ture the interaction between monetary policy, real rigidities and complementarity in
attention allocation.
The results of this paper are obtained within a standard general equilibrium frame-
work with a representative household, monopolistically competitive rms and a cen-
tral bank that sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor-type policy rule.
In this model, prices respond more to the realizations of shocks about which rms are
better informed. Technology shocks are aggregate innovations to labor productivity,
while monetary policy shocks are temporary deviations of the nominal interest rate
from the monetary policy rule. The only friction introduced in this framework is that
rms might not be well informed about the realizations of the shocks when changing
their prices. The information structure of the economy is modeled along the lines
of Mackowiak and Wiederholt [18]. There is a limit on the total attention a rm
can pay to the di¤erent shocks. This limit introduces a trade-o¤ in the allocation of
attention.
This paper relates to the large literature studying price setting decisions under
incomplete information. Incomplete information theories have been popular in ac-
counting for the sluggish price adjustment in response to monetary policy shocks.
Behind these theories there is the assumption that rms only pay attention to a
relatively small number of economic indicators. With imprecise information about
aggregate conditions, prices respond with delay to changes in nominal spending. This
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simple idea was rst proposed by Phelps [22] and formalized by Lucas [16]. More re-
cently Woodford [26], Mankiw and Reis [17], and Sims [24], have renewed attention
to imperfect information and limited information processing as sources of inertial
prices. In particular, Woodford has used an incomplete information model to explain
the sluggish response of prices to aggregate nominal shocks. According to Wood-
ford [26], such a framework could deliver prices responding more to aggregate supply
shocks than to nominal demand shocks, if rms were relatively more informed about
the former than they were about the latter. However, he leaves open the question of
why rms should choose to be relatively more informed about some types of shocks.
Sims [24] andMackowiak andWiederholt [18] study the endogenous optimal choice
of the information structure. In particular, Mackowiak and Wiederholt [18] focus on
the di¤erential response of prices to aggregate nominal shocks versus idiosyncratic
shocks in a framework with limited information-processing capabilities, and with an
exogenous process for nominal spending. In parallel and independent work Mack-
owiak and Wiederholt [19] have extended their previous analysis to study business
cycle dynamics under rational inattention in a DSGE model. Similarly to this paper,
these authors nd that this class of models generates prices and ination to be more
responsive to aggregate technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks. However,
the two papers are complements on other important dimensions. In particular, while
Mackowiak and Wiederholt [19] focus more on the interaction between attention al-
location decision by rms and real rigidities originating from imperfectly informed
households, this paper studies more in detail the role of monetary policy. Monetary
policy proves crucial for ination and price level responsiveness, a¤ecting directly the
attention allocation decision. Moreover, this paper provides a closed form solution to
the general equilibrium of the static model.
This paper also relates to the work by Branch, Carlson, Evans and McGough [7].
These authors have studied a model of endogenous inattention, where monetary pol-
icy activism inuences the overall information acquisition rate of rms. This paper
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contributes to this literature in studying the way monetary policy inuences eco-
nomic dynamics through a new margin related to the allocation of given information
processing capability across di¤erent types of information.
Finally, within the imperfect information literature, Hellwig and Veldkamp [13]
have recently emphasized the interaction of strategic complementarity in price setting
with endogenous information acquisition by rms. Relative to these authors, this
paper further shows how the interaction of strategic complementarity in price setting
and endogenous information acquisition depends on monetary policy activism.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
describes a static solution of the model. Section 4 discusses a dynamic extension of
the model. Section 5 assesses robustness of results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Apart from the information structure, this paper studies a standard general equi-
librium model of incomplete nominal adjustment with monopolistic rms along the
lines of Blanchard and Kiyotaki [6]. The information structure of rms is modeled
along the lines of Mackowiak and Wiederholt [18]: Time is discrete and innite. There
is a measure 1 of di¤erent intermediate goods, indexed by i 2 [0; 1]; each produced
by a monopolistic rm using labor as the only input into production. Intermediate
goods are aggregated into a nal good by a perfectly competitive nal good sector
through a Dixit-Stiglitz technology with constant returns to scale. On the consump-
tion side, there is an innitely-lived representative household with preferences dened
over consumption and labor supply in each period. Financial markets are complete
and nancial assets are in zero initial supply. For simplicity it is assumed that the
representative household takes its decisions under perfect information. The monetary
authority controls the risk free nominal interest rate according to a given monetary
policy rule. There are two sources of uncertainty in the economy: the rst is related
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to realizations of aggregate technology shocks to labor productivity and the second is
associated to unexpected deviations of the nominal interest rate from the monetary
policy rule.
Household Preferences: The representative households preferences over se-
quences of the nal good consumption and labor supply fCt+ ; Lt+g1=0 are given
by
Ut = Et
1X
=0
 (logCt+   Lt+ ) ; (1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, and Et () denotes the households expectations
conditional on the realizations of all variables up to period t. The household has
complete information. The households objective is to maximize (1) subject to its
sequence of ow budget constraints, for  = 0; 1; :::
Pt+Ct+ + Et+ [Qt+;t++1St++1] =Wt+Lt+ + St+ +Dt+ ; (2)
where St+ denotes the nominal value of the state-contingent asset in period t +  ,
Qt+;t++1 represents the period t+  price of one unit of currency to be delivered in
a particular state of period t+  +1, Pt+ is the price of the nal consumption good,
Wt+ the nominal wage rate, and Dt+ the aggregate prots of the corporate sector
rebated to the household. The household is subject to a borrowing constraint that
prevents engaging in Ponzi schemes,
St++1   
1X
T=t++1
Et++1 [Qt++1;T (WTLT +DT )] (3)
with certainty, and in each state of the world that may be reached in period t+  +1;
where Qt+;T =
TQ
s=t++1
Qs 1;s:
The assumption of complete nancial markets ensures the existence of a risk-free
portfolio in period t paying a nominal interest rate Rt in period t+ 1:
Monetary Policy: It is assumed that the monetary authority controls the nom-
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inal interest rate according to a Taylor-type policy rule,
Rt
R
=

Et
t+1

 Ct
Ct
c
e"r;t ; (4)
where  and c are parameters, t+1  Pt+1Pt is ination, and Ct is the level of
potential consumption, dened as the level of consumption that would hold in the
frictionless economy with perfect information; "r;t is an iid and normally distributed
monetary policy disturbance, "r;t v N (0; 2r) ;  and R are ination and the nom-
inal interest rate in the non-stochastic steady state. The policy rule given by (4)
is appealing both on theoretical and empirical grounds. Approximate (and in some
cases exact) forms of this rule are optimal for a central bank that has a quadratic
loss function in deviations of ination and output from their respective targets in a
generic macro model with price inertia.5 On the empirical side, a number of authors
have emphasized that policy rules like (4) provide reasonable good descriptions of the
way major central banks behave, at least in recent years.6 Later in the paper, I will
extend the analysis to allow for inertia in nominal interest rates.
Final Good Producers: The nal consumption good is produced by a large
number of perfectly informed producers through a constant return to scale technology
given by
Ct =
Z 1
0
(ci;t)
 1
 di
 
 1
; (5)
where  > 1 is the demand elasticity parameter. The demand for intermediate good
i follows from prots maximization by nal good producers and it is given by
ci;t = c (pi;t) = Ct

pi;t
Pt
 
: (6)
It follows from (5)   (6) that the nal good price Pt is given by the Dixit-Stiglitz
5See, e.g., Woodford [27].
6See, e.g., Orphanides [20].
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aggregator
Pt =
Z 1
0
(pi;t)
1  di
 1
1 
: (7)
Intermediate Good Producers: Each intermediate good is produced by a
single monopolistic rm using labor as the only input into production, according to
a technology with decreasing returns to scale given by
ci;t = e
"a;tLi;t; (8)
where "a;t is an iid and normally distributed technology innovation to aggregate la-
bor productivity, "a;t v N (0; 2a) ; and  2 [0; 1] determines the returns to scale in
production, corresponding for instance to the presence of a rm-specic factor that
is costly to adjust at short horizons. Firm is nominal prots are given by
i;t = pi;tc (pi;t) WtLi;t: (9)
By substituting (8) into (9), nominal prots can be expressed as a function of rm
is prices
i;t =  (pi;t) = pi;tc (pi;t) Wt

c (pi;t)
e"a;t
 1

: (10)
Given (6) and (10) ; the rst-order condition for prot-maximization under perfect
information implies7
log
 
pi;t

=  log

1


   1

+ log (Pt) +  (log (Ct)  "a;t) ; (11)
where pi;t denotes the prot-maximizing price, and  is the degree of real rigidity,
7Notice that, in deriving (11), I have used the fact that WtPt = Ct from the households intratem-
poral Euler condition.
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given by
  1
+  (1  ) : (12)
Limited information processing capabilities: In the spirit of the rational
inattention literature, information on realizations of all economic variables is assumed
to be equally available, but intermediate good producers have limited information
processing capabilities: they cannot attend perfectly to all available information. This
idea is formalized following Sims [24] by modelling limited attention as a constraint
on information ow. Intermediate good producers decide how to use the available
information ow, and in particular how to attend to the di¤erent shocks that a¤ect
the optimal price decision. Similarly to Mackowiak and Wiederholt [18], it is as-
sumed that information about technology and monetary policy shocks is processed
independently and that the noise in the decision is independent across rms. The
last assumption accords well with the idea that the constraint is the decision-makers
limited attention rather than the availability of information. Firms decide how to
allocate their attention in period zero by maximizing the discounted sum of prots
from future activity, E0
P1
t=1Q0;ti;t:
8 In order to have an analytical solution to the
attention allocation problem, this paper considers a second order Taylor expansion
of the discounted sum of future prots around the non-stochastic steady state, in
deviation from the discounted value of prots under the prot-maximizing behavior.
This quadratic approximation is given by
 
1X
t=1
tE0
h 
log (pi;t)  log
 
pi;t
2i
; (13)
where   1
2
C
 
2
 
1

  1+   2  1

  1 > 0 is a constant and C is the level
of consumption in the non-stochastic steady state.9 Given (13) and the assumption
8In the static equilibrium of this model this assumption is irrelevant as the attention allocation
choice is time-consistent.
9See appendix A1 for the derivation. In a similar framework Ma´ckoviak and Wiederholt [18]
show that solving the attention allocation problem through the quadratic approximation of the
objective delivers accurate results when the amount of information processed per period (i.e.  as
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of independent information processing about the two types of shocks, the attention
allocation problem of intermediate good producer i reads
max
fsai;t; sri;tg
 
1X
t=1
tE0
h 
log (pi;t)  log
 
pi;t
2i
; (14)
subject to the information ow constraint
I (f"a;t; "r;tg ; fsai;t; sri;tg)  ; (15)
and to the optimal price setting behavior conditional on the information available at
each period;
log (pi;t) = E

log
 
pi;t
 j stai; stri ; (16)
where stai = fsai;1; sai;2; :::; sai;t g and stri = fsri;1; sri;2; :::; sri;t g represent the realiza-
tion of the signal processes about technology and monetary policy shocks respectively
up to period t. The parameter  indexes rms total attention. In practice, if  is -
nite, the information ow constraint prevents decision makers from choosing pi;t = pi;t
in each period and state of the world. The operator I measures measures the aver-
age amount of information contained in the signal processes fsai;t; sri;tg about the
realizations of the fundamental shocks of the economy, and viceversa.10
For simplicity, this paper considers signals taking the form of fundamental shock
plus noise,
sai;t = "a;t + uai;t; uai;t s N (0; 2ai) ; (17)
sri;t = "r;t + uri;t; uri;t s N (0; 2ri) ; (18)
where uai;t and uri;t are iid errors with standard deviations ai and ri.11 This signal
denied later) is large enough so that the actual pricing behavior is not very di¤erent from the
prot-maximizing one.
10For a denition of the operator I see Appendix A2.
11It is possible to show that, in the static equilibrium of this model, the optimal signal structure
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structure, together with constraint (15) ; implies a trade-o¤ in the attention allocation
across the two types of shocks: if a rm pays more attention to one type of shock
(i.e. chooses the corresponding signal process to be relatively more informative), it
necessarily has to pay less attention to the other type of shock. While the assump-
tion that rms process information independently about technology and monetary
policy shocks is probably extreme, it has the important advantage of introducing an
endogenous information choice into an otherwise standard general equilibrium frame-
work while keeping the model tractable enough to allow for a closed form solution.
This solution provides valuable information on the interaction between the di¤erent
components of the model. In Section 5 I will show that main results of the paper are
robust to other signal structures where the independence assumption is removed. In
particular, I show that results of the paper about the interaction of monetary policy
activism and attention allocation still hold when rms are allowed, to some extent,
to process information jointly about the two types of shocks.
Equilibrium Denition: Denition 1 describes stationary equilibria in which
all the endogenous variables of the economy can be expressed as functions of the
realizations of the fundamental shocks f"a;tg and f"r;tg : In what follows the notation
Xt () reads X
 f"a;gt=0 ; f"r;gt=0 :
Denition 1 A stationary equilibrium is a set of functions; Ct () ; Lt () ; St () ;
Pt () ; Wt () ; Qt;t+1 () ; pi;t () ; pi;t () ; sai;t () and sri;t () such that:
(i) fCt () ; Lt () ; St ()g maximizes (1) subject to (2) and (3) ;
(ii) Pt () satises (7) ;
(iii) ai and ri maximize (14) subject to (15)  (16) and (17)  (18) ;
(iv) pi;t () satises (11) ;
(v) pi;t () satises (16) ;
(vi) each intermediate good producer i satises the incoming demand at pi;t () ;
(vii) all other markets clear.
in (14)  (16) is of the form (17)  (18) : Appendix C contains more details.
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3 The static equilibrium
The model is solved through a log-linearization of the rst order conditions charac-
terizing the equilibrium of the economy in a neighbor of the non-stochastic steady
state. In what follows X^t  logXt   log X denotes the value of Xt in log-deviations
from the non-stochastic steady state. Lemma 1 describes the non-stochastic steady
state.
Lemma 1 For a given normalization of P ; there exists a unique non-stochastic steady
state in which L =   1

; C = L; W = P C; R = 1

; pi = p

i = P :
Proof: See appendix B.
Solving for the equilibrium of this economy requires solving for a xed point. In
fact, the attention allocation problem in (14)   (16) depends on the stochastic process
for the prot-maximizing price, p^i;t; which in turn depends on the stochastic process
for the price level, P^t: The latter is an average over all intermediate good prices and
therefore depends itself on the solution to the attention allocation problem of rms.
Proposition 1 describes the equilibrium dynamics of P^t and C^t:
Proposition 1 There exists a static equilibrium in which the equilibrium dynamics
of economic variables in log-deviations from the non-stochastic steady state in period
t are given by a set of linear functions of "a;t and "r;t: In this equilibrium, the price
level and consumption are given by
P^t =   
1 + c
(a"a;t + r"r;t) ; (19)
C^t =  1  
1 + c
P^t   c
1 + c
"a;t   1
1 + c
"r;t; (20)
12
where a and r are coe¢ cients given by
(a; r) =
8>>><>>>:
(; 0) if  >  
  () ;  
 
1


if 1

   
(0; ) if  < 1

; (21)
while the coe¢ cients ; ; , , and the function   () are given by
  a
r
; (22)
  1  
1 + c
; (23)
 =
1  2 2
1  (1  ) (1  2 2) ; (24)
  (x) =
 + 2 2 (1  )  2  1
x
()2   2 2 (1  )2 ; (25)
 = min

2

1   ; 2
 + 2  (1  )

. (26)
Proof: See Appendix C.
The equilibrium responses of prices to the two shocks depend on relative volatility,
; on the degree of real rigidity, ; on the average quantity of information processed
per period, ; and on : The parameter  has an important economic meaning, as it
indexes relative monetary policy aggressiveness on expected ination and output-gap.
The smaller ; the more aggressive policy on expected ination or output-gap.
The function   () determines the equilibrium price level responsiveness to a given
shock as a function of relative volatility of that shock. The function   () is increasing
in its argument for values of  2 ( 1

; ): Therefore, the equilibrium price level is more
responsive to relatively more volatile shocks.
Moreover, the slope of   () with respect to its argument depends on  and  :
the smaller  and ; the larger the impact of a change in relative volatility, ; on
price level responsiveness to the two shocks.
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Lets dene relative price responsiveness to the two types of shocks as   a
r
;
where a and r are given by (21) : If  > 1 prices are relatively more responsive to
technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks and viceversa.
Proposition 2 At an interior solution of the attention allocation problem in (28),
1. Relative price responsiveness, ; is strictly increasing in relative standard devi-
ation of technology shocks, :
2. If  > 1 ( < 1) ; relative price responsiveness to technology shocks, ; is strictly
decreasing (increasing) in the degree of real rigidity, ; in the degree of relative
monetary policy aggressiveness, ; and in the upper bound on information ow,
.
Proof: See appendix D.
For illustrative purposes, in Figure 3 I plot values of  as a function of  and ;
for a given value of : For instance, if  = 2 and  = 0:5; price responsiveness to
technology shocks is only about fty percent larger than to monetary policy shocks;
if, instead,  = 2 and  = 0:3; price responsiveness to technology shocks becomes
four times as large as price responsiveness to monetary policy shocks. If  is further
decreased, the model delivers a corner solution where prices respond only to technol-
ogy shocks. Therefore, in this example, relatively more aggressive monetary policy
on expected ination and output-gap (i.e. lower ); or higher real rigidity (i.e. lower
), signicantly magnify di¤erences in price responsiveness.
Next sections discusses more in detail the way monetary policy and the other
structural parameters a¤ect equilibrium price level responsiveness through the en-
dogenous attention allocation decision.
3.1 Equilibrium attention allocation
The equilibrium price responsiveness in (21)   (26) depends on the equilibrium at-
tention allocation by rms. In fact, the more informative signals (17)   (18) are;
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the more responsive prices are to each shock. How informative is each type of signal
is determined endogenously through the attention allocation decision. This section
describes the properties of the equilibrium attention allocation.
Solving the attention allocation problem implies choosing the precision of signals
(17) (18) so to maximize (14) subject to (15) (16) : The attention allocation problem
depends on the equilibrium dynamics of the prot-maximizing price. These dynamics,
in deviations from the non-stochastic steady state, are obtained by substituting (20)
into (11) ;
p^it = (1  ) P^t  

1 + c
("a;t + "r;t) (27)
where the equilibrium dynamics of P^t are given by (21)  (26). The coe¢ cient  can
be interpreted as the degree of strategic complementarity in price setting: the smaller
; the larger the feedback from the price level to prot-maximizing prices. Given that
attention allocation decision depends on the dynamics of p^it; and the price level, P^t;
depends on the average allocation of attention of rms in the economy, the coe¢ cient
 also represents the degree of complementarity in attention allocation: the smaller
; the larger the feedback from average attention allocation to to prot-maximizing
prices and, therefore, to rms allocation of attention decision.
According to the objective of the attention allocation problem, for given dynamics
of p^it; the rms faces a smaller loss in prots at lower values of the mean square error
in price setting. Given the average amount of information processed per period, ; the
mean square error in price setting is larger, the larger the volatility of the shocks and
the larger the responsiveness of p^it to the shocks. Firms can reduce the mean square
error due to a particular shock by allocating relative more attention to it. Therefore,
rms have incentives to allocate a larger fraction of  to the type of shock that is
either more volatile or induces a larger responsiveness of the prot-maximizing price.
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, the optimal attention allocation is such that signal
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precision to each type of shock is given by

2a
2a + 
2
ai
;
2r
2r + 
2
ri

=
8>>><>>>:
(1  2 2; 0) if  > 
1  2 
!
; 1  2 !

if 1

<  < 
(0; 1  2 2) if  < 1

(28)
where ! represents prot-maximizing price responsiveness to technology shocks relative
to monetary policy shocks,
!  (1  ) a + 1
(1  ) r + 1
: (29)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Firms allocate relatively more attention to technology shocks than to monetary
policy shocks either because technology shocks are more volatile, i.e.  > 1; or because
they have a larger impact on the prot-maximizing price than monetary policy shocks,
i.e. ! > 1. However, while shock volatilities are exogenous to the model, prot-
maximizing price responsiveness is not. It depends on the responsiveness of the price
level to the di¤erent shocks, i.e. a and r: In particular, by substituting (21) into
(29) it is possible to derive ! as a function only of the structural parameters of the
model,
! =
   1

2  (1  )
   2  (1  ) : (30)
It follows from (28) and (30) that shock volatilities a¤ect the attention allocation
through two channels. First, as discussed above, for given prot-maximizing price
responsiveness to shocks, more attention is paid to more volatile shocks. Second,
shock volatilities inuence the attention allocation problem through relative prot-
maximizing responsiveness, !: since more volatile shocks receive relatively more at-
tention by all rms, they also have a higher associated price level responsiveness; the
feedback e¤ect from price level responsiveness to the prot-maximizing price respon-
siveness a¤ects the attention allocation decision. Whether this feedback reinforces or
reduces the impact of di¤erences in volatilities of shocks on the attention allocation
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decision depends on the degree of complementarity in attention allocation, : It is
at this stage that parameters of the interest rate feedback rule a¤ect the attention
allocation decision.
In the case of positive complementarity in attention allocation,  < 1; if interme-
diate good producer is competitors are more responsive to a type of shock, then it is
more worthwhile for intermediate good producer i to pay attention to that shock. In
this case, the feedback e¤ect reinforces the impact of di¤erent volatilities on attention
allocation; in contrast, in the case  > 1; if intermediate good producer is competi-
tors are more responsive to a type shock, then it is less worthwhile for intermediate
good producer i to pay attention to that shock. In this case, the feedback e¤ect
reduces the impact of di¤erent volatilities.
3.1.1 Discussion of results
This section provides a more informal discussion of results about the interaction of
real rigidities, monetary policy and complementarity in attention allocation. Eco-
nomic intuition can be gained from the prot-maximizing price equation (11), where
log(pit) depends on the price level, Pt; and on the the output-gap,
Ct
e"a;t
: It follows
from (11) that the partial elasticity of the prot-maximizing price with respect to
the price level is equal to one, while it is equal to  with respect to the output-gap:
Therefore, for given price level and output-gap dynamics, the smaller ; the relatively
larger the weight of the price level in prot-maximizing price dynamics: Higher real
rigidities imply relatively higher feedback from the price level to prot-maximizing
prices. Therefore, through the price level, the allocation of attention decision by other
rms becomes relatively more important for the individual rm decision.
In order to understand how monetary policy interacts with complementarities, we
need to understand the way monetary policy interacts with output-gap dynamics. In
the policy rule (4) ; an increase in both  and c reduces the uctuations in output-
gap to all shocks. For given price level responsiveness, the smaller responsiveness
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of the output-gap to shocks induces the price level to be relatively more important
for prot-maximizing price dynamics. Of course, in equilibrium, the increase in 
and c also a¤ects price level responsiveness, but it does so through averaging over
prices set by rms, which depends on the feedback from the price level to the prot-
maximizing price. Therefore, a monetary policy that lean against the wind increases
the feedback e¤ect from the price level to the prot-maximizing price, increasing
complementarity in attention allocation and, therefore, amplifying the di¤erence in
price responsiveness.
4 The dynamic extension
The simple general equilibrium model analyzed sofar has provided valuable economic
insights on the role of monetary policy, and other structural parameters, in deter-
mining price responsiveness to technology and monetary policy shocks. This section
extends such a model to a more dynamic framework in order to study price and
ination impulse responses to persistent innovations.
In particular, lets assume that innovations to labor productivity in (8) depend
on the following exogenous processes,
"a;t = a"a;t 1 + a;t (31)
where a;t is normal and iid, a;t v N (0; 2a) : Lets also assume that there is inertia
in nominal interest rates so that the dynamics of Rt are given by
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
r "
Et
t+1

 Ct
Ct
c
e"r;t
#1 r
; (32)
The rest of the economy is unchanged from previous sections. While this basic model
lacks many features of standard business cycle models, such as physical capital ac-
cumulation, it is able to generate quite rich dynamics of price and ination impulse
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responses to the two types of shocks.12
4.1 Model calibration
It is not possible to solve the model analytically so I use numerical methods.13 I drew
on the business cycle literature for the values of the preference parameter, , of output
elasticity to labor, ; and discount factor, : In particular, similarly to Golosov and
Lucas [12], the demand elasticity parameter  is set equal to 7, while the parameter
 is set equal to 0.64, to match the average labor share of output in the U.S. This
implies a degree of real rigidity  = 0:32:14 The discount factor  is set to  = 0:993;
so to have an annual nominal interest rate in steady state equal to 3 percent.
Monetary policy parameters,  and c; are set equal to estimates of (32) on the
U.S. data from 1979 to 2007, corresponding to the terms of Volcker and Greenspan at
the helm of the Federal Reserve.15 Given these estimates, I set  = 2; c = 0:21 and
r = 0:71: The volatility of the monetary policy shock is set equal to the standard
deviation of the residual in the estimation of (32) ; implying r = 0:0018:
The parameters of the exogenous productivity process are obtained from tting an
AR(1) process to the detrended logarithm of U.S. total factor productivity estimated
by Fernald [11] from 1979 to 2007.16 Therefore, I set a = 0:7 and a to match the
estimated standard deviation of innovations in the AR(1) process for total factor
productivity, equal to 0:006:17 Finally, similarly to Mackowiak and Wiederholt [18], I
12In a previuos version of this paper (available on the authors web site) I have solved a model with
capital accumulation, investment adjustment costs and habit formation. While the computational
burden increases, results of this paper are robust to these di¤erent assumptions.
13See Appendix E for detalis.
14Notice that this is a conservative calibration of : In the new-Keynesian literature the parameter
 is often set at lower values. For instance, Woodford [27] suggest values of  between 0.1 and 0.15.
15Estimates have been obtained applying GMM techniques, as suggested by Clarida, Gali and
Gerlter [8]. I refer to these authors for more details on the estimation technique. Data on expected
ination has been obtained from the Survey of Professional Forecasters available on-line at the
Philadelphia FED.
16Fernald [11] estimates TFP in the U.S. with a Solow residual approach, adjusting for labor
hoarding and capital utilization.
17Figure 2 plots US TFP growth rate and changes in the Federal Funds rate.
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set  = 3: This is a conservative calibration for ; as in equilibrium rms face a very
small loss from not being perfectly informed about technology and monetary policy
shocks. Such a loss is in the order of 0.1 percent of steady state revenues.
4.2 Impulse responses
In the rst column of Figure 4, I plot the impulse responses of ination and price
level to technology and monetary policy shocks: The model correctly predicts ination
and the price level to be substantially more responsive to technology shocks than to
monetary policy shocks. In fact, rms allocate 78 percent of information processing
capabilities, ; to technology shocks and only 22 percent to monetary policy shocks.
As a consequence, they are on average more informed about realizations of aggre-
gate technology shocks, justifying the asymmetry in ination and prices behavior in
response to the two shocks seen in the data.
As benchmark of comparison, in the second column of Figure 4, I plot impulse
responses of ination and the price level under the assumption that the friction in
price setting is not imperfect information but rather nominal rigidities. In particular,
I consider a standard Calvo-type model of price setting under perfect information,
where rms have an exogenous probability  of not changing their prices in any
given period. In this model, the dynamics of ination in log-deviation from the non-
stochastic steady state are given by18
^t = Et^t+1 +
(1  ) (1  )



C^t   "a;t

: (33)
I calibrate  to 0.3 as estimated by Bils and Klenow [5] on U.S. data. Comparing the
Calvo model to the rational inattention model we see that: i) ination and the price
level display similar inertia to monetary policy shocks in the two models; ii) ination
and price level respond much faster to technology shocks under rational inattention
18See Woodford [27] for a derivation.
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than under Calvo. More specically, under Calvo, the price level and ination display
identical dynamics in response to technology and monetary policy shocks. Intuitively,
in both models of price setting, the underlying framework is such that the mapping
from the two types of shocks to the prot-maximizing price is the same. However,
di¤erently from the rational inattention model, in the Calvo model the friction in
price setting is also identical across the two shocks. The latter is roughly responsible
for the di¤erent predictions of the Calvo model.
However, these results do not mean that Calvo models of price setting always
imply ination to respond the same way to technology and monetary policy shocks.
In fact, it is possible to build a model where ination responds di¤erently to the two
shocks, by allowing for a di¤erent mapping from shocks to prot-maximizing prices.
However, other authors have shown that matching ination responses to technology
and monetary policy shocks in these models is, at least, challenging.19
The advantage of the model presented in this paper is that it does not need to
rely on specic assumptions about the way technology and monetary policy shocks
transmits to prot-maximizing prices in order to explain the di¤erent behavior of
ination, but only relies on endogenous attention allocation decisions by rms.
4.3 Interest rate feedback rule and endogenous attention al-
location
The numerical implementation in the previous section has shown that the model of
rational inattention successfully accounts for the di¤erent behavior of ination in
response to technology and monetary policy shocks. From the closed form solution
to the static model of section 3 we have learned that this results depends on two
main ingredients: i) technology shocks need to be more volatile than monetary policy
shocks; ii) together with real rigidities, the weights the interest rate feedback rule
assigns to expected ination and output stabilization directly a¤ect the attention
19See Dupor et al. [10], Altig et. al. [2] and Paciello [21].
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allocation decision by rms through complementarity in attention allocation.
This section answers the following question: how important is monetary policy
activism in explaining the di¤erent behavior of ination to technology and monetary
policy shocks under rational inattention? In order to answer this question, I do the
following counterfactual exercise: I solve the model under the assumption of inactive
monetary policy, i.e.  ! 1 and c ! 0; while the remaining structural parameters
are unchanged from the benchmark calibration.20
In the rst column of Figure 5, I plot impulse responses of ination and price level
to technology and monetary policy shocks under the counterfactual monetary policy.
As we can see, ination and price level respond much more similarly to the two shocks
than under the benchmark calibration. In particular, the allocation of attention to
technology shocks drops from 78 percent of  under the benchmark calibration, to 65
percent of ; under the counterfactual policy: As a consequence, attention allocation
to monetary policy shocks rises from 22 percent to 35 percent of :
Therefore, according to the model of this paper, the active interest rate feedback
rule estimated in the data has amplied substantially the impact of di¤erentials in
shock volatilities on di¤erentials in ination responsiveness to technology and mone-
tary policy shocks. In this sense, monetary policy is as important as shock volatilities
in explaining observed ination responsiveness.
4.3.1 Discussion on impact of monetary policy on economic uctuations
Several authors have recently studied optimal monetary policy in models of imperfect
information.21 While studying optimal policy is beyond the scope of this paper, the
paper yields novel predictions on the impact of a change in the coe¢ cients of the
20One could also allow for  to respond to the change in in monetary policy. While this is realistic,
it has been studied by Branch et al. [7] in a framework with endogenous inattention, and I refer to
these authors for a discussion. This paper looks at another margin, working through
21For instance, Adam [1] has studied optimal monetary policy under imperfect information, but
wihtout attention allocation decision. Lorenzoni [15], Angelitos and LaO [3] and Angelitos and
Pavan [4] have recently studied optimal monetary policy in frameworks with imperfect information,
where the monetary policy instruments may a¤ect information dipsersion.
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Taylor rule on the economy when compared to more standard models of sticky prices.
In particular, this paper has shown that monetary policy a¤ects the economy trough
a novel channel related to the attention allocation decision.
When monetary authority changes the coe¢ cients of the Taylor rule on expected
ination and output, it a¤ects the economy trough two channels. The rst channel is
a standard one, taking place also in models of nominal rigidities: for given information
structure, a nominal interest rate responding more (less) to expected ination and
output uctuations accommodates technology shocks and o¤sets monetary policy
shocks more (less); this reduces (increases) output-gap uctuations, causing a smaller
(larger) variability of prices to both types of shocks. The second channel is novel: by
a¤ecting the degree of complementarity in attention allocation, a more (less) active
policy induces rms to pay more (less) attention to the most volatile shocks and less
(more) to the least volatile ones.
Tables 1 and 2 report standard deviations of ination and output-gap respectively,
computed conditional on technology and monetary policy shocks, under both active
and inactive policies.22
Table 1: volatility of quarter-on-quarter ination conditional on technology and
monetary policy shocks
Rational Inattention Model Calvo Model
Active Policy Inactive Policy Active Policy Inactive Policy
TECH 0.57 0.52 0.08 0.17
MP 0.16 0.38 0.08 0.17
22The active policy is the benchmark calibration:  = 2; c = 0:25: The inactive policy is  ! 1;
c ! 0:
Each statistic is scaled by the standard deviation of the corresponding shock. Equivalently, these
statistics refer to shocks with unit standard deviations.
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Table 2: volatility of quarterly output-gap conditional on technology and monetary
policy shocks
Rational Inattention Model Calvo Model
Active Policy Inactive Policy Active Policy Inactive Policy
TECH 0.57 0.54 0.11 0.20
MP 0.19 0.31 0.11 0.20
In the rational inattention model, going from the inactive to the active mone-
tary policy causes little impact on ination and output-gap variability conditional on
technology shocks. In contrast, conditional on monetary policy shocks, ination and
output-gap variability get reduced by about a half by the monetary policy activism.
This asymmetry is due to the fact that monetary policy activism causes higher frac-
tion of attention allocated to technology shocks, making rms more informed on these
shocks. This worsens monetary authority power to stabilize the economy conditional
on these shocks, so that, despite the more aggressive policy, ination and output-
gap variabilities are not reduced. In contrast, monetary policy activism causes lower
fraction of attention allocated to monetary policy shocks. This improves monetary
authority power to stabilize the economy conditional on these shocks, so that the
more aggressive policy has a larger impact on ination and output-gap variabilities
to monetary policy shocks.
These results contrast with the predictions from the Calvo model: there monetary
policy activism has similar e¤ects on output-gap and ination variability conditional
on technology and monetary policy shocks, as the frequency of price setting is exoge-
nous to the model.23 Exploring further the consequences for optimal monetary policy
of the link between monetary policy and information acquisition decisions by rms is
23Notice that volatility of ination and output-gap are generally lower under Calvo. This is due
to the conservative calibration of  under rational inattention, i.e. to the low amount of frictions
assumed in the model. I see this as a plus: decreasing  would further increase asymmetry in price
responsiveness.
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in the authors view an important avenue for future research.
Finally, one could also allow for  to respond endogenously to the changes in the
monetary policy rule. The endogeneity of information acquisition rate has already
been studied by Branch et al. [7] in a slightly di¤erent framework with endogenous
inattention. This paper focuses instead on the attention allocation margin, as this is
the margin that allows to explain the di¤erent behavior of prices in response to tech-
nology and monetary policy shocks. Intuitively, adding the extra-margin of Branch
et al. would reinforce results: for a given marginal cost of an additional unit of ; as
monetary policy gets more active, nominal variability decreases, inducing an endoge-
nous decrease in ; the decrease in  causes relative di¤erences in attention allocation
and price responsiveness to increase even more. Therefore, allowing for endogenous
 would further amplify the e¤ect of changes in monetary policy parameters on the
attention allocation.
5 Robustness analysis
This section investigates to what extent results from the model of section 2 are robust
to di¤erent set of assumptions about information channels. The insights from these
exercises reinforce the results obtained in the previous sections.
5.1 Removing the independency assumption on information
processing
So far this paper has assumed that attending to technology and monetary policy
shocks are separate activities. Hellwig and Venkateswaran [13] show that, by allowing
for a signal process that contains information on two types of shocks, it is possible
that rms respond relatively fast to a given type of shock, despite this shock is
relatively not very volatile. Therefore, lets consider the case in which signals provide
information of both types of shocks, similarly to Hellwig and Venkateswaran [13], but
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where the volatility of the noise in these signals is endogenous. In particular, lets
consider a signal structure suggested by Mackowiak and Wiederholt [18],
sai;t = p^

at +  p^

rt + uai;t; uai;t s N (0; 2ai) ; (34)
sri;t = p^

rt +  p^

at + uri;t; uri;t s N (0; 2ri) ; (35)
where p^ait and p^

rit are linear combinations of "at and "rt; representing the prot-
maximizing responses to technology and monetary policy shocks, so that from (27) I
have that p^at = p^

at + p^

rt:
24 The coe¢ cient  is a constant, indexing the information
content of each signal about the two types of shocks: if 0 <  < 1; signal sai;t is
relatively more informative about prot-maximizing responses to technology shocks
than to monetary policy shocks.
The rm will now choose ai and ri to maximize (14) subject to (15) (16) ; given
the signal structure in (34)   (35). If technology shocks are relatively more volatile
than monetary policy shocks, the optimal attention allocation is such that rms pay
relatively more attention to the signal providing relatively more information on tech-
nology shocks. As  ! 0 or  !1 the solution converges to the solution presented
in Section 2. Only if the decision-maker can attend directly to a su¢ cient statistic
concerning the prot-maximizing price ( = 1) the price responds to monetary policy
shocks in the same way as to aggregate shocks.
How much  has to be di¤erent from 1 in order for prices to respond su¢ ciently
stronger to technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks depends, among other
things, on the degree of strategic complementarity in price setting, on monetary policy
and on volatility of the two shocks. Figure 6 plots relative price responsiveness, ; as
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p^at =  

1 + c
[(1  ) a + 1] "a;t
p^mt =  

1 + c
[(1  ) m + 1] "m;t
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a function of  and ; under a calibration for which technology shocks are relatively
more volatile,  > 1: Allowing for signals providing information on both types of
shocks reduces di¤erences in price responsiveness relative to the case of independent
signals, for given parameterization of the model, but it is still the case that prices will
respond relatively more to more volatile shocks, as the volatility in the signal noise is
chosen optimally.
If signals provide information on both types of shocks, the impact of shock volatil-
ity di¤erentials on price responsiveness di¤erentials is weakened. This makes more
crucial understanding the role played by strategic complementarity in price setting
and monetary policy in magnifying the impact of volatilities di¤erentials onto alloca-
tion of attention.
5.2 Allowing for signals on endogenous aggregate variables
An alternative assumption on the information structure of the private sector is to have
rms processing information on the realizations of endogenous aggregate variables.
Specically, lets assume that each price setter can receive the following signals,
si;t =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
C^t + u
c
i;t; u
c
i;t s N (0; 2c)
P^t + u
p
i;t; u
p
i;t s N
 
0; 2p

R^t + u
r
i;t; u
r
i;t s N (0; 2r)
L^t + u
l
i;t; u
l
i;t s N (0; 2l )
; (36)
where uji;t is assumed to be iid across both time and individuals:
25 This signal structure
conveys the idea that each rm processes information about realizations of variables
that are usually available in the real world. Given that the price setter is inter-
ested in extracting information about the realization of the prot-maximizing price,
25I assume that these statistics contains no public noise. Information is therefore published and
available with no error. The noise in the signals has to be interpreted exclusively as rm specic
errors in processing the information.
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p^i;t; he will pay attention to the di¤erent signals accordingly. Di¤erently from the
signal-extraction literature, and in the spirit of the rational inattention literature,
the price setter chooses the precision of the signals, (c; p; r; l) ; to maximize the
quadratic objective in (13) ; subject to the following constraint on the average amount
of information processed per period,
I (f"a;t; "r;tg ; fsi;tg)  : (37)
By choosing how precisely to acquire information about the di¤erent signals in (36),
the price setter implicitly chooses to have its price responding more accurately to
one of the two types of shocks. To understand why, lets focus on the signals on
consumption and price level. The covariance between the prot-maximizing price
and consumption, conditional on the realizations of technology shocks, has a negative
sign: after a positive technology shock, the prot-maximizing price decreases while
consumption increases. In contrast, the covariance between the prot-maximizing
price and consumption, conditional on the realizations of monetary policy shocks, has
a positive sign: after a positive monetary policy shock, both the prot-maximizing
price and consumption decrease. If technology shocks have relatively larger volatil-
ity,  > 1, then the covariance of the prot-maximizing price with consumption is
negative, as such shocks account for a larger fraction of the overall covariance than
monetary policy shocks. Therefore, if  > 1, by responding to the arrival of informa-
tion on consumption alone, the price setter responds with the right sign if the source
of variation is a technology shock, but with the wrong sign if the source of variation
is a monetary policy shock.
However, not all type of signals imply a trade-o¤ in the sign of the response of
prices to shocks. For example, if  < 1; the price level is always positively correlated
with the prot-maximizing price, independently from the type of shock. By paying
more attention to the signal on the price level, the price setter responds with the
right sign to both types of shocks. Figure 7 plots relative price responsiveness, ; as
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a function of relative volatility of the two shocks for a given calibration of the other
parameters. Similarly to the previous case, for given parameterization of the model,
the di¤erence in price responsiveness to the two types of shocks is smaller than in the
benchmark model of section 2.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has shown that a simple model of price setting under rational inattention
and attention allocation naturally generates prices to be more responsive to aggre-
gate technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks. In the model of this paper,
rms have incentives to allocate more attention to technology shocks than to mone-
tary policy shocks because the former are more volatile than the latter. However, a
combination of relatively high real rigidity and aggressive monetary policy is needed
to magnify the impact of di¤erent volatilities on relative price responsiveness. In
particular, an interest rate feedback rule responding to expected ination and output
amplies the e¤ects of exogenous shock volatility di¤erential on price responsiveness
di¤erential to the two shocks.
This paper has derived the channel through which parameters of the Taylor rule
a¤ect the attention allocation decision by rms. According to this channel, a mon-
etary policy relatively more aggressive on ination increases relative di¤erences in
price responsiveness to technology and monetary policy shocks by inducing rms to
allocate more attention to the most volatile shock. This channel implies di¤erent
predictions about the impact of a given policy rule on economic dynamics than more
standard models of price rigidity.
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Figure 1: Responses of GDP deflator level (p) and inflation () to a one standard deviation shock to 
technology and monetary policy in the U.S. from 1960 t0 2007; source: Paciello (2009). Solid line is 
the median response, dotted lines are the 5th , 16th , 84th and 95th quantiles. Quarters are on the 
horizontal axis.  
 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Growth rate in U.S. TFP and Change in the FedFunds rate
TFP
FFR
Figure 2: Growth rate in quarterly growth rate in U.S. TFP (annual basis) estimated by Fernald (2007) 
and change in the quarterly average of the FedFunds rate (annual basis). 
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Figure 3 : Relative price responsiveness as a function of relative volatilities of shocks and 
complementarities; parameter  =3.
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Figure 4: Inflation and price level impulse responses under the benchmark calibration. 
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Figure 5: Inflation and price level impulse responses under inactive policy, 1 and c0. 
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strategic complementarities in price setting in model of section 5.1; parameters  =3, =2.
1.5 2 2.5 3
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
1.3
1.35
1.4


=0.2
=0.3
=0.4
=0.5
=0.6
=0.7
=0.8
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strategic complementarities in price setting in model of section 5.1.1; parameter  =3. 
 
Appendices
A.1 Derivation of attention allocation problem objective
The prot function of rm i at time t is given by
i;t =  (pi;t;Wt; "a;t; Ct; Pt) = PtCt

pi;t
Pt
1 
 Wt
0B@Ct

pi;t
Pt
 
e"a;t
1CA
1

; (38)
Prots can be expressed in terms of log-deviations from the non-stochastic steady
state:
i;t = 

p^i;t; W^t; "a;t; C^t; P^t

 C

eP^t+C^t+(1 )(p^i;t P^t)      1

eW^t+
1
(C^t "a;t)  (p^i;t P^t)

;
Firm i chooses the attention allocation so as to maximize the expected discounted
sum of prots expressed in of log-deviations from the non-stochastic steady state,
i0 = E0
1X
t=1
Q0;ti;t = E0
" 1X
t=1
eQ^0;t

p^i;t; W^t; "a;t; C^t; P^t
#
: (39)
Similar to Ma´ckowiak and Wiederholt [18], the value of the quadratic objective at
the prot-maximizing behavior

p^i;t+
	1
=0
is subtracted from the quadratic approx-
imation of (39) : The second-order Taylor approximation around the non-stochastic
steady state of i0 is computed: It follows that
i0 / ~i0 = E0
" 1X
t=1
eQ^0;t



p^i;t; W^t; "a;t; C^t; P^t

  

p^i;t; W^t; "a;t; C^t; P^t
#
 E0
1X
t=1
t[1p^i;t +
1
2
11p^
2
i;t +
1
2
12p^i;tW^t +
1
2
13p^i;t"a;t +
1
2
14p^i;tC^t +
1
2
15p^i;tP^t
 1p^i;t  
1
2
11p^
2
i;t  
1
2
12p^

i;tW^t  
1
2
13p^

i;t"a;t  
1
2
14p^

i;tC^t  
1
2
15p^

i;tP^t]:
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Using the fact prot-maximizing conditions imply that 1 = 0; and that p^i;t =
  1
11
1
2

12W^t + 13"a;t + 14C^t + 15P^t

; it follows that
i0 /   11
2
1X
t=1
tE0
h 
p^i;t   p^i;t
2i
:
Given that in the non-stochastic steady state pi = pi; it follows that
i0 _  
1X
t=1
tE0
h 
log (pi;t)  log
 
pi;t
2i
;
where   1
2
11 =
1
2
C

(1  )2    1


 


2
> 0.
A.2 Denition of information ow operator
Following the rational inattention literature, the operator I is dened such that
I (f"a;t; "r;tg ; fsai;t; sri;tg) = lim
T!1
1
T

H("Ta ; "
T
r ) H("Ta ; "Tr j sTa ; sTr )

; (40)
where H() denotes the entropy of a vector of realizations of random variables26,
and "Ta denotes the vector of realizations associated to the stochastic process f"a;tg
up to time T; "Ta = ("ai0; "ai1; ::::::; "aiT ); "
T
r ; s
T
a and s
T
r are dened similarly. The
larger the entropy associated with a random vector, the larger the uncertainty about
its realizations. The entropy of the random vector "Ta = ("ai0; "ai1; ::::::; "aiT ) with
density f ("ai0; "ai1; ::::::; "aiT ) is dened as:
H
 
"Ta

=  
Z +1
 1
f
 
"Ta

log2
 
f
 
"Ta

d"Ta :
In the case in which the vector "Ta has a multivariate Gaussian distribution with
matrix of variance-covariance 
T , the entropy is given by
26For a denition of entropy see Cover and Thomas (1991).
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H
 
"Ta

=
1
2
log2

(2e)T det (
T )

:
From the properties of entropies and given the assumptions f"a;tg ? f"r;tg, fsa;tg ?
fsr;tg ; f"a;tg ? fsr;tg and fsa;tg ? f"r;tg ; it follows that
I (f"a;t; "r;tg ; fsai;t; sri;tg) = I (f"a;tg ; fsai;tg) + I (f"r;tg ; fsri;tg) :
For a proof see Cover and Thomas [9].
B.1 First order conditions
Dene t as the Lagrangian multiplier on (2) : The rst order conditions to the
households problem are given by
C 1t = tPt; (41)
Qt;t+1 = 
t+1
t
; (42)
1 = tWt; (43)
where (42) holds in each state of the world in t+1, and (2) holds in each period.
For given Pt andWt; this set of equations determines the equilibrium dynamics of Ct;
Qt;t+1; Lt; t: The equilibrium condition into the labor market, Lt =
1R
0
Li;t; determines
Wt: Rt is given by (4) : The equilibrium condition for the risk-free portfolio,
Rt = Et

1
Qt;t+1

; (44)
determines the equilibrium dynamics of Pt: Eq. (6) determines ci;t: Eq. (11) deter-
mines pi;t:
The equations determining the equilibrium pi;t; sai;t and sri;t depends on the so-
lution to the problem in (14)  (16) ; and are derived below.
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B.2 Proof of existence of non-stochastic steady state
Given the absence of uncertainty and homogeneity of rms it follows from (7)
that pi = pi = P : Given stationarity, it follows from (42) and (44) that R =
1

: By
substituting pi = P into (11) it follows that L = 
 1

: Finally, from (8) it follows
that C = L:
C Proof of Proposition 1
I use the method of undetermined coe¢ cients to show that (19)   (26) is an
equilibrium.
(Step 1): Derivation of prot-maximizing responses conditional on each
shock
By substituting (20) into (11) ; it follows that
p^i;t = (1  ) P^t  

1 + c
("a;t + "r;t) : (45)
where   1 
1+c
: In addition, by substituting (19) into (45) ; p^i;t can be expressed as
the sum of two independent components, each depending on one of the two types of
shocks, p^i;t = p^

ai;t + p^

ri;t; where p^

ai;t and p^

ri;t are dened as
p^ai;t   ! (a)

1 + c
"a;t; (46)
p^ri;t   ! (r)

1 + c
"r;t; (47)
and where ! () is a linear function of a and r,
! (x) = (1  )x+ 1: (48)
(Step 2): Solving the attention allocation problem
Given (46)  (48) ; it is possible to solve the attention allocation problem in (14)
  (16) as a function of a and r. By substituting (46)   (48) into (16), and using
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the independence assumption, sai;t ? sri;t; it is possible to express p^i;t as p^i;t =
p^ai;t + p^ri;t; where p^ai;t = E

p^ai;t j stai

and p^ri;t = E

p^ri;t j stri

: Notice that in the
static equilibrium of the model in section 2 conditional expectations coincide with
unconditional ones. Therefore (14) can be expressed as
 
1X
t=1
tE0
h 
log (pi;t)  log
 
pi;t
2i
=   
1  E
h 
log (pi;t)  log
 
pi;t
2i
=
=   
1  E
h 
p^i;t   p^i;t
2i
=
=   
1  E
h 
p^ai;t   p^ai;t
2i  
1  E
h 
p^ri;t   p^ri;t
2i
where I have used pi = pi : Ma´ckowiak and Wiederholt ([18]; p.21) proof that this
problem can be expressed in terms of Gaussian signals on the fundamental shocks:
max
(ai0; ri0)
  
1  E
h 
p^ai;t   p^ai;t
2
+
 
p^ri;t   p^ri;t
2i
;
s:t:
i) : sai;t = "a;t + uai;t; uai;t s N (0; 2ai) ;
ii) : sri;t = "r;t + uri;t; uri;t s N (0; 2ri) ;
iii) : p^ai;t = E

p^ai;t j sai;t

;
iv) : p^ri;t = E

p^ri;t j sri;t

;
v) : I (f"a;t; "r;tg ; fsai;t; sri;tg)  :
where uai;t and uri;t are idiosyncratic noise, iid across rms and time. From appendix
A, and given the joint Gaussian distribution of "a;t and sai;t; and of "r;t and sri;t; it
follows that
I (f"a;t; "r;tg ; fsai;t; sri;tg) = I (f"a;tg ; fsai;tg) + I (f"r;tg ; fsri;tg)
=
1
2
log2

1 +
2a
2ai

+
1
2
log2

1 +
2r
2ri

:
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From i)-iv) and (46)  (48) it follows that
p^ai;t =   
2
a
2a + 
2
ai
! (a) sai;t;
p^ri;t =   
2
r
2r + 
2
ri
! (r) sri;t:
By substituting the results above into the objective function, the attention allocation
problem reads
max
(ai0; ri0)
  
1  
0@ 1
1 + 
2
a
2ai
(! (a)a)
2 +
1
1 + 
2
r
2ri
(! (r)r)
2
1A ; (49)
subject to the information ow constraint
1
2
log2

1 +
2a
2ai

+
1
2
log2

1 +
2r
2ri

 : (50)
The the rst-order conditions to (49)  (50) imply

2a
2a + 
2
ai
;
2r
2r + 
2
ri

=
8>>><>>>:
(1  2 2; 0) if ! > 2 
1  2  1
!
; 1  2 ! if 2  < ! < 2
(0; 1  2 2) if ! < 2 
(51)
where ! and  are dened as
!  ! (a)
! (r)
;
  a
r
:
(Step 3): Solving for undetermined coe¢ cients a and r
It follows from optimal price setting behavior by rms that p^ai;t and p^ri;t are given
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by
p^ai;t =   
2
a
2a + 
2
ai
! (a)

1 + c
("a;t + uai;t) ;
p^ri;t =   
2
r
2r + 
2
ri
! (r)

1 + c
("r;t + uri;t) ;
From the absence of ex-ante heterogeneity across rms, it follows that all rms make
the same attention allocation decision: 2ai = 
2
a and 
2
ri = 
2
r for all i: Using (19) it
follows that
 a"a;t =
Z 1
0
  
2
a
2a + 
2
ai
! (a) ["a;t + uai;t] di =  
2a
2a + 
2
ai
! (a) "a;t;
 r"r;t =
Z 1
0
  
2
r
2r + 
2
ri
! (r) ["r;t + uri;t] di =  
2r
2r + 
2
ri
! (r) "r;t;
where the second equality follows from the assumption that errors in information
processing are independent across rms,
R 1
0
uai;tdi = 0;
R 1
0
uri;tdi = 0: By substituting
(51) in the equations above it follows that:
i) in the case of an interior solution to the attention allocation problem,
a = (! (a)  2 ! (r)
1

);
r = (! (r)  2 ! (a));
by substituting (48) in the two equations above I can solve for the xed point, ob-
taining
a =   () ;
r =  

1


;
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where the function   () is given by
  (x) =
2 2 +  (1  2 2)  2  1
x
()2   2 2 (1  )2 :
ii) at the corner solution where attention is paid only to technology shocks it
follows that
a =
1  2 2
1  (1  ) (1  2 2) ;
r = 0:
iii) similarly, at the corner solution where attention is paid only to monetary policy
shocks it follows that
a = 0;
r =
1  2 2
1  (1  ) (1  2 2) :
(Step 4): Derivation of 
I derive the interval for the values of  for which there is an interior solution to
the attention allocation problem in (49)  (50). An interior solution to the attention
allocation problem, (i.e. signal to noise ratio positive and smaller than 1) requires:
i) : 2   !  2
=) 2 ! (r)
! (a)
 
=) 2! (r)
! (a)
 
=) 1
2  +  (2   2 )    2
  + 
 
2   2 
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ii) : !  0;
=) 2  
1      2
 
1  
Finally, lets dene
 = min

2

1   ; 2
 + 2  (1  )

.
(Step 5): Solving for aggregate demand
It is left to show that, given (21)   (26) ; (20) is also an equilibrium. From the
Intertemporal Euler condition to the households problem it follows that
 C^t =  EtC^t+1 + R^t   EtP^t+1 + P^t: (52)
From (4) it follows that
R^t = 

EtP^t+1   P^t

+ c

EtC^t+1   EtC^t+1

+ c

C^t   C^t

+ "r;t: (53)
From denition of C^t it follows that C^

t = "a;t: From (19)  (20) ; and denition of a
static equilibrium, it follows that EtC^t+1 = 0 and EtP^t+1 = 0: By substituting (53)
and the results above into (52) ; and solving for C^t; equation (20) is obtained:
D Proof of Proposition 4
At an interior solution, and for nite , the function   () is strictly decreasing:
 0 () =  2
 
()2   2 2 (1  )2 < 0:
Therefore,   () is decreasing in : From the denition of  in (??) ; it immediately
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follows that  is increasing in  :
@
@
=
1
  ()

 0

1


   0 ()

> 0:
The derivative of  with respect to the degree of strategic complementarity in atten-
tion allocation is given by
@
@ ()
=
1
  ()
 
@ 
 
1


@ ()
  @  ()
@ ()
!
;
where
@ 
 
1


@ ()
  @  ()
@ ()
=
2 +1 (+ 2 2 (1  )) 
()2   2 2 (1  )22

1

  

:
Therefore, it follows from above that8<:
@
@()
 0 if   1
@
@()
> 0 if  < 1
E Solving the dynamic extension
The model is solved in two steps. In the rst step, we approximate the dyamics
of ination in response to technology and monetary policy shocks in deviations from
the non-stochastic steady-state as a function of two ARMA(2,2) processes,
^t = ^a;t + ^r;t;
^a;t = a;1^a;t 1 + a;2^a;t 2 + #a;0a;t + #a;1a;t 1;
^r;t = r;1^r;t 1 + r;2^r;t 2 + #r;0r;t + #r;1r;t 1:
We give a guess for the parameters of the two ARMA processes and solve the general
equilibrium model with standard methods of undetermined coe¢ cients, where we
replace the equation dening ination dynamics from rmsprice setting behavior
with the guess above.
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In the second step, we solve for the attention allocation problem given dynamics
of pt implied by step 1. The solution to the attention allocation problem gives the
dynamics of ^a;t and ^r;t:We approximate these dynamics with ARMA(2,2) processes
as above, update the guess and start from step 1 until convergence. Notice that results
are robust to ARMA(p,q) processes for q and p > 2:
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